1. Introduction {#sec1}
===============

As classified by the International Committee for Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV), *coronaviruses* (*CoV*) are a member of the genus Coronavirus in the *Coronaviridae* family ([@bib28]). Pleomorphism is seen in the RNA of all *CoVs* viral strains, characterized by having crown-shaped peplomers 80--160 nm in size ([@bib22]; [@bib21]; [@bib75]). The viruses have a positive-sense, single-stranded ribonucleic acid (RNA) genome with a length in the range of 26--32 kilobases (kb) hence containing the biggest RNA of viral genome ([@bib1]; [@bib22]; [@bib70]). Recombination of *CoVs* occur at intensely high rates since there are constant development of transcription errors and RNA-related RNA polymerase (RdRP) vaults ([@bib75]). Such a high mutation rate renders *coronaviruses* zoonotic pathogens found in humans and a variety of animals with a wide-ranging clinical properties, from an symptomless period to the need for hospital care in the intensive care unit, which causes infections in the respiratory, gastrointestinal, hepatic, and neurologic systems ([@bib19]; [@bib22]; [@bib70]; [@bib71]). The viruses are sometimes capable of causing more severe disease in young, elderly, or immunocompromised people ([@bib71]; [@bib78]). These viral strains are subdivided into four major subclasses of alpha, beta, gamma, and delta. Alpha and beta coronaviruses have their mammalian (bats) origins, whereas gamma and delta coronaviruses are of swine and avian origins ([@bib6]; [@bib79]; [@bib83]). In humans, infection is caused by seven coronaviruses, namely *HCoV-229E* (*alpha coronavirus*), *HCoV-NL63* (*alpha coronavirus*), *HCoV-OC43* (*beta coronavirus*), *HCoV-HKU1* (*beta coronavirus*), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, or *MERS-CoV* (*beta coronavirus*), Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or *SARS-CoV* (*beta coronavirus*) ([@bib6]), and the Novel Coronavirus (*2019-nCoV*) detected recently in 2019 ([@bib2]; [@bib49]), known as *SARS-CoV-2*, which causes the Coronavirus Virus Disease of 2019 (COVID-19). Four of seven common human *CoVs (HCoVs)* result in common self-limited upper respiratory diseases: *HCoV-229E*, *HCoV-OC43*, *HCoV-NL63*, and *HCoV-HKU1* ([@bib13]). Of more than 60 *coronaviruses (CoVs)* isolates obtained from bats (*BtCoV*), the majority belong to the genus *betacoronavirus*. Bats function as huge (and very movable) *CoV* sources; most of bat species possess their specific exclusive *BtCoV*, which suggests that they have coevolved over a highly prolonged history ([@bib60]). In humans, *coronaviruses* fall into the range of viruses causing the common cold and also more serious respiratory diseases, specially, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS, 2002) and the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS, 2014), both of which are zoonotic diseases initially detected by the culture of viruses from patients with common colds in the mid-1960s ([@bib47]; [@bib50]).

1.1. The host of *SARS-CoV-2* {#sec1.1}
-----------------------------

As suggested by evolutionary assays by the use of ORF1a/1b, S, and N genes, *SARS-CoV-2* is probably a new coronavirus with independent transfer from animals to humans ([@bib14]; [@bib43]). A close identity was established between *SARS-CoV-2* and two bat-*SARS-like CoV* (*bat-SL-CoV ZC45* and *bat-SL-CoV ZXC21*), particularly the sequence identities of the E gene in *bat-SL-CoV ZC45* (GenBank accession no. MG772933.1), *bat-SL-CoVZXC21* (GenBank accession no. MG772934.1) existed 98.7% among 13 gene sites, but it was more apart from *SARS-CoV* (\~79% similarity) and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS*-*CoV) (\~50% resemblance)([@bib39]; [@bib50]; [@bib68]). An analysis of data obtained from the initial outburst using a full-length genome study revealed that the *SARS-CoV-2* sequence had a 79.5% sequence identity in common with *SARS-CoV* ([@bib105]). Sequence and phylogenetic analyses illustrated that *SARS-CoV-*2 had a longer spike protein, a dissimilar relative phylogeny of the complete RNA-reliant RNA polymerase gene, and a differing apparent genetic distance ([@bib3]; [@bib105]), indicating that *SARS-CoV-2* is a novel *betacoronavirus*, not the *SARS-CoV* ([@bib3]). Nevertheless, *SARS-CoV-2* and *SARS* have a common ancestor to the bat *HKU9-1 coronavirus* ([@bib98]). In Wuhan, *SARS-CoV-2* is a member of the genera *beta coronavirus* and genome analysis indicates that *SARS-CoV-*2 has closer relations to *bat-SARS-like (SL)-ZC45* and *bat- SL-ZXC21* ([@bib105]). Even so, the dissimilarities are also possibly suggestive of additional intermediate hosts present between bats and humans. An investigational group observed that 70% of pangolins possessed *β-CoV*. A coronavirus isolate obtained from the pangolins contained a genome with a high similarity to that from *SARS-CoV-2,* and a genome sequence resemblance of 99% indicates that pangolin is likely the intermediate host of *SARS-CoV-2* ([@bib62]).

1.2. Diseases caused by *coronaviruses* {#sec1.2}
---------------------------------------

Among the seven subtypes of *coronaviruses* capable of infecting humans, *beta-coronaviruses* can possibly induce serious disease and mortalities. The initial isolates of *coronaviruses* were obtained from fowls with respiratory disease (infective bronchitis) in the 1930s ([@bib6]). Until 2002, *human coronaviruses* (*HCoVs*) were linked only to mild respiratory tract disease, which were estimated to cause 15 %--25% of the entire common colds ([@bib26]). This underwent a change in 2002 upon identification of a *human coronavirus* as the causative agent of an emerging disease named SARS. The SARS spread was taken under control, but a different new CoV isolate was collected from patients admitted to hospitals with severe respiratory disease in Saudi Arabia during 2014 ([@bib22]; [@bib70]; [@bib106]). Since the majority of affected patients were the inhabitants or travellers to Middle East countries, the newly detected disease was termed MERS and the causative *coronavirus* was named *HCoV-MERS* ([@bib106]). The transmission of most animal and human *CoVs* occurs via the faecal-oral path, and their primary proliferation place is in epithelial cells, in which virus reproduction induces local respiratory symptoms or diarrhoea ([@bib6]). Yet, *CoVs* is capable of causing acute to lethal disease. Besides seasonal flu, the recounted pathogens of pneumonia consist of *adenovirus*, *coronavirus 229E/NL63/OC43*, *human bocavirus*, *human metapneumovirus*, *parainfluenza virus 1/2/3*, *rhinovirus*, and *respiratory syncytial virus A/B* ([@bib17]; [@bib45], [@bib46]; [@bib77]). Additionally, these viruses are able to induce co-infection in the situation of public-derived bacterial pneumonia ([@bib43]).

1.3. The transmission routes {#sec1.3}
----------------------------

Due to the relationship of the *SARS-CoV-2* to the genus *betacoronavirus*, the diseases and transmission paths for the genus are depicted in [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"} .Fig. 1Betacoronavirus diseases and transmission paths (the routes for COVID-19 under study and not yet confirmed) ([@bib6]; [@bib52]) for betacronovirus except *SARS-CoV-2*.Fig. 1

The usual spread paths of the novel coronavirus are spreading directly (cough, sneeze, and droplet inhalation transmission) and contact transmission (contact with oral, nasal, and eye mucous membranes) ([@bib58]; [@bib62]; [@bib80]). Eye contact can likely pave the ground effectively for the viral entry into the body ([@bib61], [@bib62]; [@bib81]). Despite an insignificant risk of contract with *SARS-CoV-2* from the faeces of a patient, there are proofs indicating that *SARS-CoV-2* is likely to result in enteric contagion and be found in faeces ([@bib29]). About 2--10% of patients with established COVID-19 manifested with diarrhoea two reports indicated that SARS*-CoV-2* viral RNA segments were detected in the stool of COVID-19 patients ([@bib15]; [@bib38]; [@bib83], [@bib84]). Up to now, there is only one report on the culture of *SARS-CoV-2* from a single stool sample ([@bib32]). Investigations observing viral nucleic acids in these patients, additional studies are required to discover the existence of viral elements and nucleic acid levels for demonstrating faecal-oral contagion ([@bib95]). Moreover, research has demonstrated that respiratory viruses are transmittable among individuals via contacting directly or indirectly, or coarse or small droplets, and *SARS-CoV-2* is transmittable through direct or indirect salivary route ([@bib81]). To be precise, aerosols denote particles suspending in a gas ([@bib80]). As shown by a study in 2010, the likelihood of transmitting influenza by aerosols could be reduced by improving ventilation design and prevention of generating aerosols ([@bib93]). It is usually believed that transmitting by aerosols is plausible due to the high risk of cross-infection among physicians, nurses, and personnel ([@bib34], [@bib35], [@bib36]). Research suggests that *SARS-CoV-2* is probably air-transmitted via aerosols produce during therapeutic actions ([@bib38]; [@bib82]; [@bib86]). Remarkably, a case of 2019-nCoV infection reported in Germany reveals that *SARS-CoV-2* may also transmitted via contacting with symptomless patients ([@bib72]). Even so, transmissions through aerosol and faecal-oral routes are those making people concerned, necessitating to be confirmed with additional studies. Fomite transmission, i.e. viral dissemination via a material, including a door handgrip, door-bell, or inhalator, also has a critical contribution to the virus spread ([@bib41]; [@bib90]). Additionally, postnatal infection with *SARS-CoV-2*-borne pneumonia in neonates could be boosted by the contact levels of faecal infection, aerosol transmission, and contacting closely with the mother ([@bib55]). Up to now, no investigations are available reporting COVID-19 transmission via exposure to blood ([@bib105]).

2. Environmental transmission possibility {#sec2}
=========================================

Besides public movement and person-to-person connections, viral contagion and survivability can be impacted by environmental players (e.g., influenza), but no research has yet studied the topic about this new pathogen. Absolute humidity, described as the water content in ambient air, is a robust determining factor in the environment for other viral spreads ([@bib36]; [@bib92]; [@bib99]). For instance, influenza viruses live lengthier on surfaces or in droplets in cold and dry air, which increases the possibility of succeeding contagion. It is, therefore, imperative to apprehend the impacts of environmental elements on the progressive outburst to endorse making decisions on controlling the disease, particularly in places in which there is a likely underestimation of the transmission risk, including in moist and warmer areas. This paper focuses on drinking water, sewage systems, solid waste, and ambient air as potential paths of contagion in the environment.

2.1. Transmission by drinking water {#sec2.1}
-----------------------------------

As a tiny infective agent, a virus proliferates only within the organismal living cells but not within contaminated cells, or in the event of contaminating cells. Viruses are found independently in the form of particles. Waterborne viruses are different with regard to their genome contents and capsid proteins, but such viruses have some common attributes making them of specific interest concerning the risk of disease endemics related to drinking water infections ([@bib25]). Water-spread viral pathogens, categorized in terms of moderate to high health importance by the WHO, consist of *adenovirus, astrovirus, hepatitis A* and *E viruses, rotavirus, norovirus*, and other *caliciviruses*, as well as *enteroviruses* including *coxsackieviruses* and *polioviruses* ([@bib25]). Also, viruses of urine urinary excretion (e.g. *polyomaviruses* and *cytomegalovirus*) have the potential to be disseminated via water ([@bib25]; [@bib27]; [@bib88]). Other viruses (e.g. *influenza* and *coronaviruses*) have been considered as organisms being transmittable via drinking water, but there is indecisive evidence ([@bib25]; [@bib88]). Besides, the COVID-19 virus has not been shown to be present in drinking water sources, and existing documentation indicate a low risk to water sources ([@bib90]). Extreme numbers of viruses are excreted in fecal matter even in a symptomless manner. For instance, up to 10^11^ *norovirus* particles are detectable per gram of faeces ([@bib25]). Additionally, non-enfold viruses can survive in water for prolonged time-periods ([@bib23]; [@bib63]). With taking account of these features, insufficient sanitization of faecal-infected drinking water facilitates endemics of viral gastroenteritis from consumption. Remarkably, drinking water is also capable of transmitting viruses through inhalation or aspiration (e.g., water-bathing) or contacting with skin and eyes (e.g., swimming), which cause respiratory and ophthalmic contaminations ([@bib63]). COVID-19 virus is an encased virus with a brittle exterior membrane. Encased viruses have in general less environmental stability with more susceptibility to such oxidants as chlorine ([@bib63]). Although no documentation is available hitherto on the COVID-19 virus survivability in water or sewerage ([@bib90]), the virus can probably be deactivated considerably quicker than non-encased human intestinal viruses (e.g., *adenovirus, norovirus, rotavirus*, and *hepatitis A*) with confirmed transmission ability through water. Heller et al. by considering the detection of *SARS-CoV-2* in stools and sewage, proposed the faecal-oral transmission of COVID-19 from environment to human([@bib30]). According to other concordant investigations, the *human coronavirus* illustrated a 99.9% die-out from 2 days to 2 weeks at 23 °C and 25 °C, respectively, ([@bib90]). The die-out is facilitated by heat, high or low pH, sunshine, and commonly used sanitizers (e.g., chlorine) ([@bib63]).

### 2.1.1. Water treatment process against viruses {#sec2.1.1}

Commonly used water purification methods globally are physical removal of pathogenic agents by treating conventionally and inactivation of pathogenic agents via application of ultraviolet light or chemical oxidizing agents including chlorine, chloramines, ozone, and chlorine dioxide. Due to the tiny size of viruses (mostly with a diameter ranging between 5 and 400 nm), though some *paramyxoviruses* may be up to 14,000 nm long, traditional purification, including filtration ([Fig. 2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"} ), is not effective in physical removal of viruses.Fig. 2Schematic flow diagram of a drinking water treatment plant.Fig. 2

Fujioka et al. reported bacterial removal rates of 95·2 %-99·3% during full-scale water filtering ([@bib24]). Thus, viral removals are not expectedly lower than bacterial ones (\>0.2 μm in size) due to the size. The use of sanitizers is greatly dependent upon water chemistry and regional rules. Free chlorine (i.e., the sum of hypochlorous acid and hypochlorite ions produced by dissolving and hydrolysing chlorine gas in water) is the disinfection agent with the uppermost usage around the world ([@bib33]). This powerful oxidizing agent inactivates the majority of viruses ([@bib63]). Nonetheless, treat with free chlorine may form regularized toxic disinfection by-products (DBPs). *Adenovirus* has susceptibility to deactivation with free chlorine with high resistance to deactivation using both monochloramine and UV light ([@bib63]). Chlorine dioxide and ozone are also robust oxidizing agents, both of which can effectively control viruses ([@bib25]). Irrespective of the sanitization utilized at a drinking water facility, the travel of purified water from the treatment plant to the tap can lead to cross-contamination all over the extent of water dissemination substructure because of cavitation and random depressurisation; thus, it is necessary to utilize alternative sanitizers in distribution systems. Free chlorine and monochloramine are the only two sanitizers that can maintain remains in the distribution system. In spite of more powerful disinfecting effect of free chlorine in terms of inactivating pathogens, monochloramine leaves residues with a higher stability in distribution systems hence both are useable. *Human coronavirus* can persist for only two days in dechlorinated tap water and hospital effluent at 20 °C ([@bib90]). A main barricade to extensive use of water quality settings is that not a single sanitization technique is effectual towards the whole viruses. To have efficient concentrated sanitization, free chlorine remaining concentration must be ≥ 0·5 mg/L following a minimum of 30 min after contact time at pH \< 8·0 ([@bib88]). A chlorine residue should remain all over the distribution system.

### 2.1.2. Detection of viruses in drinking water {#sec2.1.2}

Water purification facilities routinely examine the existence of faecal coliforms in water sources, but they do not examine the existence of infective viruses due to either impossibility or unfeasibility of detecting or propagating infective viral particles cost-effectively and in a well-timed fashion. Whereas, viral proteins or genomes can be detected swiftly utilizing enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) or quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR)-based technologies, respectively, the techniques cannot discriminate between infective and non-infective viral particles. Integrated cell culture-PCR (ICC-PCR) lowers the time demands of conventional plaque tests allowing infective viruses to proliferate in host cells, but a cell culture used in the technique is not even practical at water treatment facilities ([@bib25]). Despite advancements obtained in collecting viruses from huge volumes of water, it remains as a fast way of detecting survivable viruses. Multiple existing barricades preclude detection of viruses in drinking water. To consider technologically, viral replication needs using tissue culture, a system requiring elevated time, workforce, skill, and costly apparatus. Additionally, some of these viruses are not culturable simply (*adenovirus* serotypes 40 and 41) or at all (*human norovirus, hepatitis A virus*) in culture media. Accordingly, conventional viral development tests (plaque assays) are either inaccessible or highly time-taking rendering them impractical for water treatment facilities. Generally, the potential of *SARS-CoV-2* transmission via water sources is low([@bib7]) but more research need to study the viability of the virus and contamination of water source that can transmit the *SARS-CoV-2* to humans.

2.2. Transmission by sewerage systems {#sec2.2}
-------------------------------------

The majority of faecal-oral-spread viruses have high resistance in the water milieu, in which they are likely to present improved survival in spite of the sanitization procedures usually utilized to treat drinking water and sewerage ([@bib33]). The bulk of such viruses are non-encased viruses, such as *norovirus, enterovirus, Aichi virus, parechovirus, hepatitis A* and *E viruses* (*HAV* and *HEV*, respectively), *astrovirus, rotavirus,* and *adenovirus* (*Ad*) ([@bib25]). These viruses are detectable in effluents as people excrete about 100g of stool daily, and 10^5^- 10^9^ intestinal viral particles per gram of stool are released every day from a diseased person ([@bib91]). Since 10^7^-10^13^ viral particles are excreted daily from an diseased person ([@bib91]), a possibly helpful tool is to analyse entering effluent to disclose the existence and quantification of defecated human pathogenic agents, thereby providing an estimate of the numbers of diseased individuals([@bib42]). If the virus is present, it will not indicate a relation between the viral sequences in effluent and those from patients of the same sampling time and area ([@bib31]). Multiple virus recognition methods were designed for detecting *poliovirus* in effluent in accordance to the WHO polio removal program ([@bib53]). Seven weekly combined untreated effluent samples from Ryaverket (a large wastewater treatment plant in Gothenburg) were analysed to determine the existence of seven differing intestinal viruses: *norovirus, astrovirus, rotavirus, adenovirus, Aichi virus, hepatitis A virus,* and *hepatitis E virus* ([@bib31]). The virus is detectable prior to occurring an endemic, as reported by a research on *norovirus*, because the virus may be defecated in stool prior to the incidence of indications ([@bib10]), which is 1--2 days for *norovirus* GII and 4--5 days for *astrovirus*([@bib44]) whereas, the defecation duration is lengthier for *hepatitis A* and *E viruses*, occurring for about 7 weeks ([@bib69]). No documentation is available hitherto about the COVID-19 virus transmission through sewer systems, with or without wastewater treatment. Besides, no proof can be found regarding the counteraction with SARS by effluent and wastewater treatment staffs. Genetically compared effluent viruses with those from clinical periodic cases and endemics can put forward a model to understand the epidemiology of intestinal viral pathogens in the population. Thus, surveillance of effluent regularly for such viruses can offer an ahead-of-time alarm of a potential forthcoming outbreaks. The encumbrance of contagion in a special population can also be estimated by the use of typing as an instrument. Based on a research work in Helsinki, Finland, *poliovirus* was detectable in effluent if only 1 in 10,000 residents defecated the virus ([@bib37]). Even so, it may identify genomes from non-infective viral particles as well ([@bib31]). A study conducted in Spain on six wastewater treatment plants in an area with lowest COVID-19 prevalence revealed that two secondary water sample were polluted. Comparison of the data with data of confirmed COVID-19 cases at municipally level revealed that people were shedding *SARS-CoV-2* RNA in their faeces even before the ﬁrst cases were reported by local or national authorities ([@bib66]). In case of identifying only viral segments, it will continue providing an acceptable denotation about the types of viruses circulating in the community and those infecting individuals not seeking therapeutic care. It is recommendable to utilize this procedure for forecasting COVID-19 in the public([@bib66]). As a fraction of a merged population health strategy, effluent passed through sewer systems should undergo ideal treatment in decently established and properly controlled consolidated wastewater treatment utilities. Finally, it is possible to consider a decontamination phase if available sewer water purification plants are not subjected to optimisation to for viral removal. It is essential to follow the best applications to protect the professional health of labours at sanitization treatment installations. Labours need to put on suitable personal protective equipment (PPE), including protecting outer wear, gloves, boots, goggles, or face shields, masks, regularly hand hygiene, and avoiding the touch of the eyes, nose, and mouth with dirty hands.

2.3. Transmission by healthcare waste {#sec2.3}
-------------------------------------

Leftovers created during health care activities possess great potentiality for contamination, and its insufficient managing practices exposes health care personnel (e.g., physicians, nurses, and laboratory staffs), waste carriers, and patients in hospitals to health risks both directly and indirectly ([@bib4]). Health-care waste (HCW) carries a vast array of pathogenic agents. Professional risk associated with COVID-19 contact is a main concerning issue, particularly in developing countries in which people do not rigorously follow a protocol for waste treatment. Documentations are absent about human exposure directly and insecurely throughout treatment of HCW resulting in the COVID-19 endemic. A report by the [@bib87] indicate that urban and solid HCW have identical contents of microorganisms, and that 2% of blood-stained waste tested positively for *hepatitis viruses*, *poliovirus*, and *echovirus* identified in the defiled diapers of household waste([@bib87]). Pathogenic viruses, such as *NoVs* and *hepatitis B virus*, have been identified in human tissue waste ([@bib87])([@bib87]). There is little information suggesting that viral RNA was detectable in the plasmas or sera of COVID-19 infected people ([@bib13]). Even so, observations of researches conducted experimentally demonstrated that some viruses (e.g. respiratory syncytial virus) have partial survivability under settings possibly found in a variety of wastes ([@bib59]), and that viral loads are usually low. Thus, an essential issue is that labours follow group and personal protecting procedures including gloves, respiratory masks, glasses, and overalls that are previously supplied in all working environment security plans ([@bib9]). Since minor amounts of information are available from individual plants, it is necessary to perform more inclusive surveillance examinations. All HCW created throughout the care of COVID-19 patients need to be gathered securely in engineered vessels and bags, handled, and then carefully discarded and/or treated, preferably in situ ([@bib90]). In case of moving wastes ex situ, its treatment and destruction place and mechanism must be understood critically. Prior to treatment of HCW, it is necessary to wear suitable PPE (boots, apron, long-sleeved gown, thick gloves, mask, and goggles), and perform appropriate hand sanitation after elimination. To gain more data, the reader is referred to the WHO Safe Management of Wastes from Health-Care Activities guidance([@bib89]). An emphasis is placed on necessary trainings in preventing contagion, in particular concerning waste treatment and removal. It is imperative to follow the most acceptable operations to safely manage HCW, such as assignment of accountability and providing adequate human and material resources for safe removal of waste.

2.4. Transmission by inanimate surfaces {#sec2.4}
---------------------------------------

Non-encased viruses (e.g. *coxsackieviruses, rotavirus,* or *poliovirus*) can be viable for prolonged times on surfaces whereas, encased viruses, such as *H1N1* and *human coronaviruses*, are still infective on surfaces after few days. A variety of environmental situations and parameters including heat, moisture, pH, and surface type influence the viability of desiccated viruses ([@bib23]). The ingredients of the media can affect the viability of viruses as well. Environmental surfaces probably contribute to the spread of hospital-derived viral contaminations ([@bib73]; [@bib85]; [@bib101]). At times of endemics in health care services, samples taken from surfaces discovered *SARS-CoV* nucleic acids on surfaces and non-living substances ([@bib11]), suggesting that surfaces could be sources of virus spread for *SARS-CoV-2*. Environmental viral tests identify them in protein-laden media (such as serum) and protein-poor media, including water. Hydrophobic substances prevent the spread of droplets, and their non-porous feature improves viral survivability ([@bib23]). Survival duration of the COVID-19 causing virus on surfaces is not certainly known, but it apparently behaves the same as other *coronaviruses*. Recently, reviewing the viability of *human coronaviruses* on surfaces revealed high survivability, in the range of 2 h--9 days([@bib90]). [@bib11] demonstrated that infective *SARS-CoV* survived for a period of 28 days at 4 °C, and the deactivation was lowermost at 20% relative humidity (RH). Faster deactivation occurred at 20 °C than at 4 °C at all moisture levels; the viruses were viable for 5--28 days, and a low RH led to the slowest deactivation. Deactivation of viruses was more rapid at 40 °C than at 20 °C ([@bib11]). The association between deactivation and RH was not monotone, and low RH (20%) and high RH (80%) resulted in better persistence or a higher protecting impact than at mild RH (50%) ([@bib11]). Deactivation is dividable into two steps of initial represented by water loss because of evaporating free water from the surface ([@bib103]), exposing viruses to a liquid-air interface, which leads to viral deactivation. The discrepancy can be attributed to rehydration, noticeably inactivating non-lipid viruses, including *poliovirus* ([@bib103]). Even so, iterative drying cannot influence non-encased viruses. Encased viruses showed more sensitivity than non-encased ones in the second stage of viral survival, which began once the liquid could not be seen on the lids anymore. Probably, the viruses survived for days or even weeks on dry hydrophobic surfaces ([@bib23]; [@bib88]). Media constituents and component contents had a clear contribution upon exposure of virus suspensions to desiccation ([@bib23]; [@bib88]). *Coronaviruses* are encased, positive-sense, and single-stranded RNA viruses. They typically show vulnerability to acid-pH, basic-pH, and heat, but apparently have more stability at 4 °C. The lipid bilayer casing of these viruses has rather sensitivity to dryness, heat, and detersives; thus, their sterilisation is simpler than non-encased viruses ([@bib23]; [@bib88]). Several studies report that a succeeding elevation in solute concentrations in droplets could modulate the survivability of viruses against desiccation. Because the contents of media has a contribution the survivability of viruses subjected to desiccation, further investigations are necessary on the viral viability in natural media (clinical or environmental), rather than determined media. Contamination of surfaces in hospital was investigated by et al. ([@bib67])which reported that 35% of COVID-19 patient\'s ward, 50% undressing room and no clean areas were contaminated with COVID-19. The most contaminated surfaces were hand sanitizer dispensers, medical equipment, medical equipment touch screens, and shelves for medical equipment, bedrails and door handles, respectively. Kampf et al. presented evidence that efficient inactivation of *coronaviruses* would be possible by surface sanitizers containing 62%-71% ethanol, 0·5% hydrogen peroxide, or 0·1% sodium hypochlorite for approx. 1 min, but other biocides, e.g. 0·05%-0·2% benzalkonium chloride or 0·02% chlorhexidine digluconate, presented lower effectiveness ([@bib40]).

2.5. Transmission by ambient air {#sec2.5}
--------------------------------

Various pathogens c are present in the air and have the potential to be spread over extended spaces ([@bib36]), which comprise *influenza virus, SARS virus*, *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*, foot and mouth disease, and several other ones. The majority of patients with COVID-19 were affected severely by acute respiratory infection, including fever, cough, and shortness of breath, leading to death of most of such people. Given that respiratory spread and the spread of survivable virus placed on the surfaces is possible, the viability of air-transmitted viral aerosolised should be importantly investigated in ambient air([@bib56]). Felipe FalcãoSobral et al. found the negative association between air temperature and COVID-19 cases. In addition, they found rainfall as an important climate factor in *SARS-CoV-2* transmission([@bib76]). Furthermore, the impact of weather on COVID-19 pandemic in Turkey assessed by Mehmet Şahin. He found inverse correlation between wind speed, air humidity and temperature as the weather parameters with COVID-19 cases([@bib74]). The similar results obtained by [@bib94]; [@bib100] as well. A study([@bib96]) showed a significant relation (Poisson regression model) between air quality index (AQI) that determine the ambient air quality with COVID-19 cases for Chinese cities. A recent extensive research has studied the persistence of diverse strains of air-conveyed *influenza virus* and ([@bib64]) observed that infectious virus were present following 90 min of aerosolisation. Air temperature and humidity, microbial resistance to external physical and biological stresses, and solar intensity have been introduced to be some significant factors of air that affect the persistence and distribution of microorganisms ([@bib64]). Cases may be transmitted continually and grow (exponentially) and rapidly within an spectrum of humidity varying from cold and dry provinces in China, including Jilin and Heilongjiang, to hot regions, such as Guangxi, and Singapore ([@bib51]). A conclusion can be drawn that climatic changes lonely (i.e., rises of temperature and humidity upon reaching spring and summer months in the Northern Hemisphere) will not essentially result in reductions in case frequencies with no execution of widespread public health interventions. [@bib9] reported that totally 30% (12/40) of air samples and 13·5% (5/37) of surface samples obtained from the solid waste removal location were positive for the virus. [@bib65] investigated the persistence of aerosolised *MERS-CoV* in ambient air. They detected a rather high count of viral particles at 25 °C, as opposed to influenza strains, with over 63% of living particles staying in the air following 60 min of aerosolisation. The inactivation was much more effectual at 38 °C, with merely 4·7% live viruses observed after completing the 60 min run. The reported findings illustrate that the strain is capable of surviving during prolonged times and has the potential of spreading because of respiratory contagion even under tropical and arid weather situations relating to the Middle Eastern area, the place of origin for this virus. Doremalen et al. found identical persistence of *HCoV-19* and *SARS-CoV* under the settings examined experimentally ([@bib82]). According to their findings, *HCoV-19* retained its viability in aerosols in the course of their experimental period (3 h) with a reduced in infective titre between 10^3.5^ and 10^2.7^ TCID~50~/L, to the same as that noticed for *SARS-CoV*, from 10^4.3^ to 10^3.5^ TCID~50~/mL. The above surveys suggest that aerosol and fomite spread of *HCoV-19* is probable because the virus is able to retain its viability in aerosols for several hours and on surfaces for a number of days. Ogen studied the nitrogen dioxide (NO~2~) levels of ambient air as a causal factor to coronavirus (COVID-19) fatality in Turkey. The results showed as the NO~2~ can lead to lung inflammatory and may be increasing susceptibility to air pollution, so chronic airway disease due to long-term exposure to air pollutants can increase the COVID-19 fatality([@bib57]). In regard with impact of particulate matter, Mehmood et al. stated that although the short- and long-term exposure with PM~2.5~ resulted in higher incidence of lethality of COVID-19, however, estimation of PM~2.5~ incidence is required to experimental and epidemiological studies([@bib54]). Correia et al. addressed indoor and environmental transmission of the *SARS-CoV-2* through Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Systems (HVAC)([@bib18]). By controlling this transmission routs the pandemic control of COVID-19 can be more effective. However, [@bib20]did not found viral RNA in air samples taken from patient room with confirmed COVID-19 at distance of 2--5 m from the beds.

3. New ways of *SARS-CoV-2* transmission that maybe facilitated by angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) {#sec3}
=========================================================================================================

The commonly observed indications of COVID-19 at disease incidence are fever, fatigue, dry cough, myalgia, and dyspnoea ([@bib84]). Few patients could also present headache, dizziness, abdominal pain, diarrhoea, nausea, and vomiting ([@bib84]). Illness incidence may result in continuous respiratory inability because of alveolar harm and even demise. The expression and dissemination of angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) in the human body can be indicative of the possible entrance of *SARS-CoV-*2 that play as a receptor([@bib5]). High ACE2 expression was detected in type II alveolar cells (AT2) of the lung, oesophagus, upper and stratified epithelial cells, absorptive enterocytes from the ileum and colon, cholangiocytes, myocardial cells, kidney proximal tubule cells, and bladder urothelial cells ([@bib97]; [@bib102]). These observations revealed that the organs with high ACE2-expressing cells would be regarded as those with high potential risk for *SARS-CoV-2* contamination ([@bib97]). Xu et al. modelled the spike protein of the receptor for *SARS-CoV-2* and found that ACE2 might be the receptor for this viral strain ([@bib97]). Likewise, ACE2 is a receptor for *SARS-nCoV* and *NL63* ([@bib8]). Based on their model, the coupling strength is greater between *SARS-CoV-2* and ACE2 than the limit needed for viral contamination, though it is poorer than that between *SARS-nCoV* and ACE2. Zhou et al. carried out viral contamination assays and detected that ACE2 would be necessary for entering *SARS-CoV-2* into HeLa cells ([@bib104]). Such information demonstrate that ACE2 may be the receptor for *SARS-CoV-2*. Zhao et al. examined normal lung tissue cells of eight healthy persons and noticed that the only Asian donor presented over five times the ACE2 expressing cell ratio as white and African American donors. These findings suggest that the Asian population is likely to be increasingly susceptible, though such a conclusion requires further documentation. Hao [@bib97] presented evidence of ACE2 expression on the mucosa of the oral cavity. It is interesting that this receptor contained a high bulk of epithelial cells of the tongue, which have justified the basic mode of action by which the oral cavity has the potential of a high risk for *SARS-CoV-2* contamination sensitivity; such discoveries also present proof of forthcoming preventing policies in dental clinical practice ([@bib62]) and everyday life. The observations also imply that ACE2 has a significant contribution to cellular entrance([@bib16]); hence, ACE2-expressing cells can serve as target cells, and have susceptibility to *SARS-CoV-2* contamination. It may be the *SARS-COV-2* virus uses the ACE2 receptor to improvement access the cell interior that the virus can do replication there easily([@bib48]).

4. Conclusion {#sec4}
=============

The accessible data about environmental spread paths for *SARS-CoV-*2 that have not been earlier investigated to date were reviewed here, indicating the availability of scarce or unavailable documentation concerning thereof. Despite the unconfirmed contagion of *SARS-CoV-2* via drinking water, sewer systems, and ambient air revealed by accessible guidelines, reviewed data strengthen the suspicion by highlighting the robust potential of environmental spread via these paths hence necessitating extra studies. Moreover, the ACE2 that was recognised as a cellular doorway for *SARS-CoV-2 entrance the cells by some studies*, which may be useable for identifying novel paths of *SARS-CoV-2* contagion.
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